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I. INTRODUCTION
There is increasing recognition today of the existence of a type of in-
tangible property consisting of acquired, organized, and stored informa-
tion.' This concept of information-as-property is inevitably destined to
* Visiting Professor, The University of Pittsburgh Law School; Associate Professor of Law,
Widener University School of Law; B.A. 1973, the State University of New York at Stonybrook;
J.D., 1976, the University of Michigan. The author would like to thank Mary Ellen Roberts for
typing the preliminary drafts of this Article, Jeff Eckman and Neda Biggs for research assistance,
and Susan Goldberg, John Jancka, Alan Garfield, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Joseph deFuria, and Roger
Cunningham for their very helpful comments on early drafts. Of course, I alone bear the responsi-
bility for the views expressed in this Article. [The author would have preferred to capitalize consti-
tutional amendments but this law review follows the Texas Law Review Manual on Style which
requires lower case. -Eds.]
1. This trend toward recognition culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus
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clash with the discovery procedures of modem litigation2 and, to a lesser
degree, with various other disclosure requirements.3 In 1938, when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure first introduced extensive discovery into
the process of civil litigation,4 the drafters incorporated an underlying
assumption that no person had an interest in, or a right to withhold,
information needed in a judicial proceeding.5 Informational property-
essentially a product of the computer age 6 -could not have been antici-
pated in the Federal Rules, which preceded the first commercially pro-
duced computer by sixteen years.7
Many companies now exist whose business consists solely of buying
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The Court held that certain trade secret data which would be
informational property, as the term is employed in this Article, is property for purposes of protection
from governmental taking without compensation. Id. at 1003-04. See generally R. MILGRIM, 1
TRADE SECRETS, § 1.01 (1985); McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Hcalth and Safety
Information, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1980); Note, Federal Disclosure Statutes and the Fifth Amend-
ment: The New Status of Trade Secrets, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 334, 335 n.4 (1987) [hereinafter Disclo-
sure Statutes]; Note, Compensating Manufacturers Submitting Health and Safety Data to Support
Product Registrations After Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 61 IND. L. J. 189, 192-94 (1986) [hereinafter
Compensating Manufacturers]; Note, Constitutional Limitations on Government Disclosure of Private
Trade Secret Information, 56 IND. L. J. 347, 357 (1981).
In cases involving informational property, the value of that property may be in the facts and data
stored, the organization and analysis of that data, or both.
2. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P., 26-37, 45.
3. A number of state and federal statutes require the disclosure of information for purposes
other than litigation. Some examples are discussed infra at notes 15-21, 114-15, 118-52 and accom-
panying texts.
4. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 402-06 (4th ed. 1983). See also id. at 539 ("Discovery
was the Cinderella of the changes in procedure made by the Civil Rules. Now there are those who
are saying that the carriage has turned into a pumpkin .... ").
5. For example, Dean Wigmore wrote in 1904: "For more than three centuries it has now
been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hard-
wicke) has a right to every man's evidence." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev.
1961). This assumption is clearly reflected in the broad party and nonparty discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet Rule 26 gives special protection to experts. Expert wit-
nesses may not be subject to discovery without permission of the court, and such permission is
usually conditioned upon payment for the expert's time by the party requesting the discovery. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 545-47 (history of discovery
provisions regarding experts). The reasons for giving special protection to experts are much the
same as the reasons set forth in this Article for protecting informational property. Indeed, an ex-
pert's knowledge of his field is a form of informational property and the special protection given to
experts presents an important and helpful analogy. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
6. Informational property can, of course, exist without computers. For example, the property
at issue in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) was not dependent on computer genera-
tion. The recent increase in the availability of computers, however, has produced a corresponding
increase in the amount of informational property created.
7. See J. SOMA, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 17 (1976). The first commercially marketed com-
puter appeared in 1954 and met with little success.
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and selling information. Serving a discovery request on such a company
is, in reality, nothing short of using the legal process to steal their inven-
tory. Further, in some cases, the result may be even more drastic. Dis-
covery may result in the complete taking or destruction of an
information service's business because the sources of information on
which such companies depend may be unwilling to furnish information
in the future (or may furnish inaccurate information in the future) when
they realize that the information can be secured by an opposing party in
litigation or by certain government officials.8
This use of the discovery rules brings discovery into direct conflict
with the constitutional prohibitions against state9 or federal1° govern-
mental taking of property without compensation. Inevitably, the consti-
tutional values of the fifth and fourteenth amendments will prevail over
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, state rules of procedure, and re-
lated state and federal statutes in such cases. The time is thus fast ap-
proaching when discovery rules and certain disclosure statutes will have
to be redesigned to take this emerging problem into account by providing
for fair compensation to the owners of informational property when com-
pensation is feasible, and ceasing to require disclosure where compensa-
tion cannot be achieved.
This Article employs civil discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure"1 as its paradigm for testing the constitutionality of requiring
the uncompensated disclosure of informational property. This Article
does not distinguish between cases where informational property is
8. This problem exists even though a party using discovery techniques often could secure the
same information directly from the same sources as the information service. Compiling the raw data
is often difficult, and may require expertise. Thus, many litigants will not ultimately have such data
available if the information service is not compelled to provide it.
Two additional losses to information services should be noted. First, for much the same reasons
that the sources of information may dry up, the customers who have, in effect, sponsored the genera-
tion of the information may cease buying it in order to discourage the information service from
keeping it. Second, the agents and officers of the information service are required to spend a signifi-
cant amount of paid business time testifying in order to introduce and explain the data.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fifth amendment's protection has been made applicable to
the states via the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, Burlington, & Quince R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 239 (1897). Although a private citizen sends a discovery request, it is the coercive force of
the state government (or federal government in the case of federal court action, see infra note 10)
that takes the property. Absent that government force, a citizen sending a discovery request will be
ignored.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 45.
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sought from a party or a nonparty. Both are possible under existing
rules.12 Although information services are most often pursued as non-
party witnesses, the taking analysis does not turn on the distinction.13
The same analysis implicitly covers state discovery rules. Differences in
state procedure are, for the purposes of this Article, inconsequential. 1 4
A number of state and federal statutes likewise compel disclosure of
facts which may, at times, include informational property. Examples of
such statutes include: the various C.I.D. (Civil Investigative Demand)
statutes authorizing administrative agencies to conduct discovery even in
the absence of specific litigation;15 the FIFRA (Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act) provisions that were at issue in Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto;6 Freedom of Information Act provisions; 7 certain federal
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) regulations;1 8
Clean Air Act provisions; 9 the Fair Credit Reporting Act provisions
which require uncompensated disclosure of an applicant's credit infor-
mation to the applicant under certain circumstances; 20 and various
12. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 45 (subpoena power against nonparties); FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 30
(oral deposition of any witness); FED. R. CIv. P. Rule 45 (used to obtain the presence of non-
parties); FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 31 (depositions on written questions: less frequently used, same as
oral deposition as applied to nonparties).
Interrogatories employed pursuant to Rule 33 may be used only on a party, although depositions
on written questions are used on nonparties for many of the same purposes. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
Requests for production of documents and the like under Rule 34 are likewise only applicable to
parties, but a subpoena duces tecum may be used in conjunction with a deposition to obtain the same
results. FED. R. CIV. P. 34. Further, an independent action in the nature of a bill of discovery
remains available (although rarely used) for permitting inspection of places, documents, and things
in possession of non-parties. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 584.
Physical and mental exams, which seldom involve informational property, are limited to parties
pursuant to Rule 35. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
13. One may argue that nonparties present a better case for objecting to the taking. Parties,
especially plaintiffs, are often seen as "volunteering" for litigation. The Court, in an analogous con-
text, persuasively rejected any such suggestion. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112-16
(1964).
14. For example, some states require that discovery questions call for an answer that is ad-
missable, while the federal rules and most states allow any discovery question calculated to lead to
information which is admissable.
15. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1982). But see 86 F.R.D. 603, 647.
16. 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (discussing 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1982) (FIFRA)). Another such ex-
ample would be the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) 15 U.S.C. § 2601- § 2629 (1982).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552-552b (1982).
18. See, eg., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982). Another such example would be the Water Pollution Pre-
vention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t (1982). Section 1681j requires free disclosure of information to any
person who has been denied credit based on negative information in a credit report.
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"Right to Know" acts which provide for public disclosure of the use of
toxic substances.21 This Article examines these disclosure-type statutes
later in somewhat greater detail. Some, such as those authorizing
C.I.D.'s, are sufficiently similar to discovery rules that the taking analysis
is identical. Others, such as the OSHA and FIFRA disclosure provi-
sions, often involve companies engaging in particular types of potentially
dangerous activities which may permit the government to require disclo-
sure as the price for permitting the conduct.
The section of this Article which follows defines the term "informa-
tional property" and explains the choice of that term for the purposes of
the analysis of this Article. Section III sets forth the analysis employed
in taking cases and the ramifications of that analysis for informational
property. Section IV then considers certain counterarguments which are
unique to the application of the taking analysis to informational prop-
erty. Finally, Section V of this Article synthesizes the foregoing argu-
ments, considers the appropriate remedy for bringing discovery
provisions into compliance with the prohibition against uncompensated
takings, and places the analysis employed in this Article in the broader
context of the purpose underlying the constitutional prohibition against
taking private property for public use without compensation.
II. INFORMATIONAL PROPERTY
At the outset it is necessary to explain why this Article creates and
employs the term "informational property." The case law and legal liter-
ature to date deal exclusively with intellectual property. While so doing,
however, a few cases and commentators have begun to notice that intel-
lectual property is too broad a term for the type of analysis with which
this Article is concerned.22 Intellectual property includes intangible
21. A considerable number of these acts were cited in the Solicitor General's brief on behalf of
the EPA in Monsanto. See Brief of Appellant Environmental Protection Agency at 40 n.29, Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (No. 83-196), reprinted in U. S. Supreme Court Briefs
and Records, 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The New Jersey Right to Know Act is discussed in New Jersey
State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606, 609-12 (D.N.J. 1985). Michigan's Act is
discussed in Sparrow & Trickey, Whose "Right to Know" What?, MICH. B.J. 668-70 (July, 1987).
22. Some precedent exists for distinguishing between technical and nontechnical trade secrets
(or similar terms) whereby the term "nontechnical trade secrets" appears to refer to informational
property. See, e.g., Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 359 ("nontechnical trade secrets"); id.
at 360 ("confidential business information"); id. at 361 (dichotomy between "business and technical
secrets"). The Monsanto opinion mentions the categories of "trade secrets [and] commercial or
financial information." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 993 (1984). The latter two
categories appear to include informational property.
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property rights created to promote artistic endeavors,2 3 advances in tech-
nology,24 distinguishing concepts, designs, or names which reflect valua-
ble advertising and accumulated goodwill,25 as well as informational
property as it is defined here. For many purposes it is not necessary to
distinguish between these types of intellectual property and courts have
not done so in the past in taking cases. The point of this Article, how-
ever, is that informational property is unique among types of intellectual
property for the purposes of taking analysis.
Other types of intellectual property differ from informational property
in terms of the taking analysis because each of the other types will not be
"taken" if it is used or disclosed while still appropriately protected. For
example, a trademark may be disclosed and displayed during litigation
without "taking" its value because the law continues to prohibit its use
by commercial competitors.26 The value remains despite the trademark's
disclosure in the course of discovery or its use as an exhibit in the court-
room. Further, and far more importantly, the discovery process has not
given the litigants the type of use of the trademark for which the trade-
mark owner would normally charge a fee to a licensee. As another ex-
ample, a typical trade secret, such as a faster way of producing a
particular product or the formula of a popular soft drink, may likewise
be disclosed during litigation under suitable protective orders and not be
"taken" by the disclosure.27 Informational property, on the other hand,
is, by definition, property which cannot be disclosed and yet protected.
Virtually any use," and certainly the type of use involved during litiga-
tion, is a use for which the owner would have, in the absence of compul-
sion by the courts, charged a fee. Thus, informational property must be
23. See, ag., 17 U.S.C. § 101-118 (1982) (copyright laws); 35 U.S.C. § 171-§ 173 (1982) (design
patents).
24. For example, patents and "technical" trade secrets. See 35 U.S.C. § 101-104 (1982);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
25. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1982) (trademarks). A number of state law doctrines deal
with protection of commercial identity as well.
26. The value of a trademark consists only of being able to use it to identify and advertise a
product.
27. See, eg., Wearly v. Fed. Trade Comm'n., 462 F. Supp. 589, 594, 598-99 (D.N.J. 1978),
vacated on other grounds, 616 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980). See also
Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But see Truswal Systems
Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng., Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1213-16 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Rich, J., dissenting).
28. Cf. infra text subsequent to note 35 (unusual hypothetical case where informational prop-
erty is not "taken" because litigation process does not use it as information).
[Vol. 66:703
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treated here separately from other intellectual property for the purposes
of the taking analysis.
Informational property, then, consists of a property interest in infor-
mation which is stored, acquired, and organized for its value as informa-
tion. The same information may be both intellectual and informational
property. By way of example, telephone books, which are presently pro-
tected through the copyright laws under "sweat of the brow" theory,
present a close case.29 This example, however, suffers from the fact that
the phone companies presently do not sell phone books to readers, and it
is therefore difficult to complain that a taking would occur if a court
compelled a phone company to give a litigant a free phone book. The
property interest nevertheless remains, and the taking question would
arise if companies charged for phone books.
In a sense, the key to the taking argument of this Article and, there-
fore, the definition of informational property employed by it, lies in a
comparison of the use for which the owner of the property would nor-
mally be compensated and the use for which it is being taken by forced
disclosure. Contrasting two examples will illustrate this point. Consider
first a typical trade secret, such as the formula for a well-known soft
drink, Coca-Cola. 0 If a person sues the manufacturer for an injury
caused by an alleged defect in the product, that person may genuinely
need to know the formula used in making the soft drink in order to prove
his case. Courts typically order that such trade secrets be disclosed
under protective restrictions designed to present the trade secret from
becoming available to competitors.3" The formula is simply intellectual
29. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985); Leon v.
Pacific Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver Radford Co.,
140 F. 539, 542 (Ist Cir. 1905).
Many of the problems discussed in Francione, Facing the Nation: The Standards for Copyright,
Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 519 (1986), Jackson, "Fact
Works'" Copyrightability and Infringement, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 833 (1963), suggest that the
sweat of the brow theory should be abandoned. The recent disaster in West Publishing Co. v. Mead
Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (Page numbers, in West Law reporters, other than
the first page of each case, held to be copyrightable because of the considerable labor involved in
assembling west's reporter system, despite the fact that no labor goes into creating the page numbers,
the actual words of the opinions West publishes are not copyrighted, and despite the fact that the
page on which a particular statement appears is a fact of independent significance which lawyers are
required to cite in briefs.) certainly demonstrates the dangers of taking this theory too far.
30. "Coca-Cola" is a registered trademark of The Coca-Cola Company. Note that this use of
the trademark "Coca-Cola" is not one for which the trademark owner would normally charge a fee.
Thus, for example, if a court were to refer to it in a published opinion, no taking would occur.
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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property; it is being used for a purpose (proving the cause of an alleged
defect) entirely different from that for which the owner would require
payment (licensing the means for making a popular soft drink). Pro-
vided that the formula is not "leaked" to Coke's competitors, no taking
occurs when the formula is obtained through discovery. 32 The plaintiff is
not using judicial process to obtain a free license to make a similar soft
drink.
As a second hypothetical case, however, consider a litigant's attempt
to discover data held by a company which services the real estate sales
industry by maintaining detailed information concerning all real estate
sales. Such a company may contract with many or all realtors to obtain
access to the sale price, description, location, sales agent, and other infor-
mation involved in every real estate transaction. Persons in the real es-
tate business could find this information useful in appraising properties,
deciding where to make future investments, evaluating the effectiveness
of particular sales agents or branch offices, and in various other capaci-
ties.3 3 Such information could likewise prove helpful in some types of
litigation. For example, in an antitrust case against a large realty com-
pany, one could deduce that company's market share from the data.
Under current rules of procedure, a litigant could discover the informa-
tion for free if the information service is a named defendant, 34 and at a
nominal cost if the information service is not a party.35 In such a case
involving informational property, a litigant is thereby able to use the in-
formation for free in exactly the same way a paying customer would-to
ascertain trends and facts concerning the sale of real estate and various
persons selling real estate.
The focus of the taking analysis is not so much that particular data
bases are informational property, as it is the context in which the taking
32. A significant problem remains, however, because courts often cannot effectively guarantee
that trade secret protective orders will be followed. An exploration of this problem is beyond the
scope of this Article. Because of this problem, many companies that own valuable trade secrets
frequently choose to default with regard to certain issues in litigation rather than risk unauthorized
disclosure.
33. Likewise, a prospective real estate purchaser or seller could, for a fee, use the same data to
select a broker. Indeed, the government might pay for the same data if it used the data to select a
broker to buy or sell government property.
34. The normal practice under Rule 34 is for each party to bear his own costs. FED. R. Civ. P.
34. The court may use its power under Rule 26 to issue protective orders to force an opponent to
pay such costs only in an unusual case. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
35. In such cases the court would use its Rule 45 subpoena power and the litigant would pay a
nominal witness fee. FED. R. CiV. P. 45.
[Vol. 66:703
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occurs-the comparison between the coerced use and the use for which
the data are valuable in the marketplace. A modification of the second
hypothetical involving the real estate information service can further il-
lustrate this point. Imagine instead that the information service is suing
its computer programmer or the manufacturer of its computers over an
alleged defect in computer storage. If the computer company used the
discovery process to obtain access to the database for the purpose of
checking its accuracy (and, therefore, the effectiveness of the computers
or the programming) no taking would exist. The database would still
constitute informational property, but this highly unusual type of disclo-
sure would not "take" it. The circumstances of virtually all litigation,
however, require that information services give the litigants information
for uses that the information service would otherwise charge a fee.
If NASA needed data from an information service concerning, for ex-
ample, the consumption rate of rocket fuels in order to aid in the space
program, it would have to pay the market price to obtain that informa-
tion from a consultant. Why, then, should the FTC, if it uses a C.I.D.,
not have to pay for data that shows market shares if the company provid-
ing access to that data would otherwise charge for it? In either case, the
inventory of a business dealing in information is being taken by a govern-
mental agency for a public purpose.
The term informational property, then, refers to a property interest in
information. If a litigant can acquire the information for free or at a
nominal cost under present litigation procedures, but the information is
used in a similar manner at a much higher cost when the coercive effect
of discovery rules or related statutes is not invoked, an unconstitutional
taking has occurred.
III. TAKING PROPERTY UNDER THE FIFTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The fifth amendment's command, "nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation,"36 made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment,3 7 is generally analyzed in four
steps. First, one must determine whether the affected item is "property."
Second, the government must have "taken" it. Third, the taking must be
for a "public purpose" or it cannot occur, even with compensation.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See supra note 9.
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Fourth, one must ascertain whether the government has provided "just
compensation". This Article examines these four inquiries seriatim, and
follows with a brief discussion of waiver doctrines which might be em-
ployed to circumvent the taking analysis entirely.
A. Defining Protected Property
Although the Constitution protects property, it does not explicitly de-
fine the property protected. The source of law that defines such property
interests is a matter of some controversy 38 into which the scope of this
Article limits but a brief foray. The Court often identifies that source
with a flowery inexactitude similar to that found in Board of Regents v.
Roth: protected property interests "are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independ-
ent source such as state law."
39
Oddly enough, the Monsanto decision relied solely on Missouri (state)
law.' In truth, state law per se cannot be the source. Rather, it was
because Missouri law reflected a broader consensus that the Court recog-
nized it as a matter of constitutional judicially created law. A minor
problem with the reliance on Missouri law in Monsanto lies in the mon-
strous and debatable assumption the Court made concerning choice of
38. For example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980), the Court
claimed, "The United States, as opposed to the several States, [is not] possessed of residual authority
that enables it to define 'property' in the first instance." Justice Blackmun, however, concurred in
the opinion of the Court but dissented from this one sentence. Id. at 88-89. See generally, Annota-
tion, Federal Courts: Federal or State Law as Applicable in Determining What is Property for Which
Compensation Must be Paid Upon its Taking by the Federal Government, 1 A.L.R. FED. 479 (1972 &
Supp. 1986).
Even if the view as to the source of property rights presented in this Article is not accepted, most
of the analysis with regard to the taking of informational property remains intact. I have, therefore,
endeavored to avoid detracting from the main theme of the Article by delving too deeply into the
source(s) of property for the purpose of takings analysis. If state law defines property, no problem is
presented. A clear trend in state law exists. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text. If slight
variations in state law become crucial, however, an insurmountable choice of law question will be
presented in every case of national or multi-state application, such as Monsanto.
39. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
40. 467 U.S. at 10034. See Reddi-Whip, Inc. v. Lemay Valve Co., 354 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Mo.
App. 1962). Commentators have accepted the Court's statement at face value, questioning neither
the assumption that state law defines federal constitutional obligations nor the assumption that Mis-
souri law would be the particular state law to govern. See, e.g., Note, Compensating Manufacturers,
supra note 1, at 193 ("In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Supreme Court decided for the first time that
trade secrets could be considered property if state law made them so." (footnote omitted, emphasis
added)).
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law doctrines.4 A far more major problem occurs because Missouri, if it
possessed the final word as to the definition of property, would be the
final arbiter of the Constitution. Missouri could redefine property to ex-
clude land just before beginning an ambitious highway project. Further,
it is clear that federal law also may create property interests.42
The Court may rely on both federal and state law to create property.
Neither, strictly speaking, defines property, however, because neither
may abrogate property interests created by either.
One thing is clear: A court can never use the very law that is chal-
lenged as a taking to define the property rights at issue. The Court in
Monsanto recognized this "taking circularity" and therefore rejected the
EPA's argument that FIFRA had "pre-empted" state law:
If Congress can "pre-empt" state property law in the manner advocated by
EPA, then the Taking Clause has lost all vitality. This Court has stated
that a sovereign, "by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into
public property without compensation.... This is [what] ... the Taking
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.",
43
Thus, the ultimate power to define property lies at the federal constitu-
tional level, beyond legislative and ordinary common law' alteration.
41. The courts and parties involved in Monsanto appear to have assumed that Missouri law
would govern either because Monsanto has its headquarters there or because the suit was filed there.
The latter proposition is, of course, frightening when applied to questions of constitutional law be-
cause it gives the party selecting the forum absolute power. The former proposition is not desirable
either as companies could alter their constitutional rights by moving their headquarters.
The modern choice of law theories weigh everything from contacts with the transaction or govern-
mental interests of the state(s) involved to which of the competing rules of law is the "better" rule.
Any attempt to imagine a court intelligently applying these doctrines to multi-state property ques-
tions determining constitutional rights evokes memories of the late Dean Prosser's famous comment:
"The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited
by learned but eccentric professors, who theorize about mysterious matters in a strong and incom-
prehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it."
William L. Prosser in Interstate Publications, part of the Cook lectures at the University of Michi-
gan. See Comment, Workman's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws 11 BAYLOR L. REv. 202,
202 n.1 (1959).
42. See, eg., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)(federal Social Security disability
benefits are property). But see supra note 38.
43. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1012 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 164 (1980)). In the face of this language the subsequent analysis in Monsanto, which used
FIFRA to define the property and defeat property interests at will, is astounding. See infra notes
119-25, 134-39 and accompanying texts. For a more plausible explanation of Monsanto, see infra
text accompanying notes 140-46.
44. See infra text accompanying note 5 1. In a comment on a preliminary draft of this Article,
John Jancka questioned whether this assertion was always true, asking whether a statute prohibiting
the possesion of certain drugs or firearms would be an unconstitutional taking under my analysis.
1988]
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Any other approach makes the taking clause a nullity. Perhaps the states
and the federal government can create (but not abrogate) property rights,
but it is more likely that state law (by consensus, rather than from a
particular state)45 is best treated as evidence of what the constitutional
rule is.
"The" source of law defining property for purposes of taking analysis
is most easily understood if it is viewed as having two sources because
there are actually two types of property at issue. In the absence of ex-
isting terminology, I will describe these as "general" and "special" prop-
erty.46 General property consists of property which exists in all
jurisdictions and may not be abrogated by the law of any state or by
federal law. General property is defined by a federal constitutional com-
mon law emanating from the fifth and fourteenth amendments. It con-
sists of property that the drafters of the Constitution, if they could have
Any assertion pushed to its extreme encounters difficulties, but I believe that the answer depends on
the timing of the acquisition of the property, and the degree to which the law permits a profitable
disposal of the property. For example, it is currently illegal to possess heroin. A person who
purchases heroin under the present state of the law does not acquire a property interest because the
purchase is prohibited. A more difficult case is presented when a new statute makes owning firearms
illegal. Those who purchased firearms prior to the enactment of the statute have a property right. If
they may still sell the firearms to persons living in other areas where firearms are legal, I would not
find the law to be an unconstitutional taking. In the most extreme hypothetical, where the firearms
are made illegal, and must be turned in to the police for destruction, I believe that a taking has
occurred. The owners of the firearms must be compensated or the statute is unconstitutional. Cf
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (state prohibition laws do not take property of brew-
ery owner, but only because land and buildings continue to have other uses).
45. This observation is particularly compelling in a case, such as Monsanto, where the events
and holding are not tied to any particular state, See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. Such
an approach is wise, lest the constitutionality of FIFRA's provisions or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Further, in national cases such as Monsanto, the
result would depend upon clever forum shopping, possibly even by using the dreaded rule of Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) by analogy.
46. Although terms of analysis have never been developed to express the dichotomy between
the two types of property, past terminology does reflect, at least in part, an awareness of the two
distinct areas. For example, some cases have suggested a category of "core common law" rights
which appears to correspond to the term general property as used in this Article. The term "quasi
property" has been used on rare occasions in ways which appear to correspond to the concept of
special property as used in this Article. See Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 352-53, espe-
cially n.86. Further the cases finding forms of property in terms of the "vested rights" doctrine, or
by an equitable estoppel appear to strikingly parallel the special property analysis of this article. See
D. CALLiES & R. FREILicH, LAND USE 199-201 (1986); Callies, Land Use: Herein of Vested Rights,
Plans, and the Relationship of Planning and Controls, 2 U. HAW. L. REV. 167 (1979); Callies,
Nukolii and Vested Rights, 36 LAND USE L. & ZONING DiG. 14 (1983) Heeter, Zoning Estoppel:
Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB.
L. ANN. 63.
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seen modem economic circumstances, would have protected. Thus, the
fact that the law of most or all states defines something as property is
strong evidence that it is general property.4 7
It is important to realize that the judicially created law which defines
general property results from constitutional interpretation. It cannot be
reversed by legislation or nonconstitutional federal common law. In
other words, federal law exists at two levels: constitutional48 and non-
constitutional.49 In the legislative branch this distinction is clear because
the procedure used to change the law differs so radically. Congress
changes nonconstitutional federal law by passing a new statute-a fairly
routine event requiring only a majority vote. To effectuate a change in
constitutional federal law, however, Congress must work through the
cumbersome amendment process provided in Article V.5"
In the judicial arena, the distinction between decisions of constitu-
tional and nonconstitutional magnitude tends to blur. Both can be
changed by subsequent judicial decision." In contrast, as stated above,
47. See, eg., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMMINENT
DOMAIN 24-25 (1985). However, the purposes of the takings clause must still be taken into account.
Thus, even though most states recognize goodwill as a form of property, taking analysis does not.
See, e.g., Community Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 15 Cal.3d 813, 543 P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976). This treatment of goodwill may be justified because goodwill is
something which will necessarily build up over time in every business, with or without assurance
that it will not be taken away.
48. In the legislative arena, the only examples of making law that is constitutional in nature and
magnitude are the various amendments to the Constitution. In the judicial arena, examples include
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), but compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) which is a
federal common law supervisory power decision preceding Mapp.
49. In the legislative arena, the examples of federal nonconstitutional law are all federal stat-
utes. In the judicial arena, examples of nonconstitutional federal common law include Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); and Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824). Osborn was subsequently overruled by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1982). If
Osborn had been constitutional in magnitude it could only have been overruled by an amendment.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (ruling of constitutional magnitude, based on tenth
amendment, overruled by the twenty-sixth amendment).
50. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article five requires that either two thirds of both houses proposes an
amendment or two thirds of the legislatures of the states make an application. Ratification of an
amendment then requires agreement by three-fourths of either the legislatures of the states or con-
ventions held in the states. Congress may specify either mode of ratification. State conventions have
been used only once-to repeal the eighteenth amendment (prohibition).
51. The Court's practice has been, however, to change its decisions that are of constitutional
magnitude only in unusual cases and after the greatest deliberation. Thus, the Court perceives a
greater need for stability in its constitutional decisions than it does in its ordinary common law
decisions. Only twice has the Court ever declared one of its own decisions unconstitutional. See
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842);
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legislative action by subsequent statute, however, can change only non-
constitutional court-made law; judicially created constitutional law re-
quires an amendment. Further, of course, only federal constitution
judicial decisions can set aside inconsistent statutes.52 The difference be-
tween constitutional and nonconstitutional federal law thus becomes
quite real when applied to judicially created law. In the context of taking
analysis this distinction is important because the takings clause, as a con-
stitutional provision, thus has the power to set aside statutes, and it is
impossible to legislate the takings clause out of existence. Thus, the law
defining general property is judicially created, but it is federal and consti-
tutional in nature and magnitude, and it should not be confused with
nonconstitutional federal court-made law.
The law defining general property creates a federal constitutional
"floor" below which state or federal law may not go in defining property.
State law (whether common law or statutory)53 or nonconstitutional fed-
eral law (whether judicially-created or statutory),54 however, may grant
more rights than are protected by notions of general property. These
grants create what the Court sometimes calls "reasonable investment-
backed expectations."55 If such expectations are created, the takings
clause may be used to protect investments made in reliance on the law.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The
Court has occasionally changed its constitutional rulings without declaring the prior ruling unconsti-
tutional. See, eg., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), changing the rule of Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), because the states had not acted to protect the fourth amendment rights as Wolfhad
suggested they would. Yet cases such as Mapp and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985), where the Court "flip flops" on a question of constitutional magnitude only because
of the change of one member of the Court, are rare because they receive heavy criticism and damage
the legitimacy of the Court. Changes in nonconsitutional doctrine are made far more easily.
52. This is most clearly true in cases involving inconsistent federal statutes. In cases involving
inconsistent statutes (or state common law), supremacy clause and preemption questions beyond the
scope of this Article arise, and state law may have to give way to non-constitutional federal common
law. Even in such cases, however, the demise of state law is not automatic as it is when the federal
law is of constitutional magnitude.
53. See, ag., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) (property inter-
est in state common law contract rights). Examples of state statutory interests creating special prop-
erty rights include horse trainers' licenses, utility services, disability benefits, high school education,
and the like. See cases cited in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431 (1982).
54. An example of a federal statute creating special property rights is Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) (federal social security disability benefits). An example of federal non-constitutional
court-made law creating special property rights is Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (un-
tenured state college professor's right not to be dismissed in complex context).
55. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005
(1984).
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These rights, then, are a "special" form of property. 6 Existing takings
clause analysis notwithstanding, state or nonconstitutional federal law
directly "creates" them, and they can easily vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Further, "special" property may be abrogated prospectively
by a change in law, because the concept of special property in takings
analysis protects only reliance-based interests. 7 General property, in
contrast, cannot be legislatively abrogated, even prospectively. Only a
change in the constitutional definition could abrogate general property.5 8
Note that, in the context of special property, the reliance-based analy-
sis is being employed in the novel analysis of this Article to define the
property. The same type of analysis, and some of the same terminology,
is usually employed (in connection with general property) to determine if
a taking has occurred.9 Thus, the reader who is accustomed to existing
analysis must be careful not to confuse these two distinct uses of reliance-
based analysis.'
The holding in Monsanto that trade secrets, which constituted infor-
mational property as this Article employs that term, are property seems
eminently correct.61 Indeed, in so stating, the Court wisely held informa-
tional property to be general property, as that term is used in this Arti-
56. The analytical basis for special property presented here more closely parallels existing anal-
ysis for "vested rights" takings. See supra note 46.
57. An example of this analysis is found in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006
(1984). This aspect of Monsanto is discussed infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text. See also
Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
58. One can only hypothesize a society in the future where ownership of land, as we presently
know it, is irrelevant. In such a case, land might cease to be property under the constitutional
common law. The definition of property is a product of economic realities at the time. See infra text
accompanying note 64.
59. In determining whether a claimed right constitutes special property, a court looks to
whether state or federal law has created "reasonable investment-backed expectations." This factor is
also one of three factors the Court considers in cases involving general property that is only partially
acquired to determine whether a taking has occurred which requires compensation. The three fac-
tors are; "the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations." Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (emphasis added).
60. The Court's principal mistake in Monsanto was to confuse these two uses of the reliance
factor. Purporting to determine whether a taking had occurred, the Court actually determined
whether Monsanto had a property interest. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
61. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-4. The property at issue was data on the safety of certain
chemicals in pesticides. The EPA proposed to use the data to aid companies, other than Monsanto,
applying for permission to market pesticides containing the chemicals. Clearly those companies
would, in the absence of EPA compulsion under FIFRA, have to choose between the cost of generat-
ing the same data themselves or buying it from Monsanto. Thus, although Monsanto generally does
not act as an information service, it was an owner of informational property in this context.
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cle.62 The Court has always given general property a broad definition;
one which is "not [limited to] the vulgar and untechnical sense of the
physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recog-
nized by law .... The Constitutional provision is addressed to every sort
of interest the citizen may possess."' 63 Property rights in informational
property are presently protected under trade secret law. This protection
is necessary because it provides the incentive for information to be cre-
ated, organized, and stored. Without that incentive, information which
is socially useful would not be available for anyone's use. Thus, informa-
tional property fits the classic model around which rights in intangible
and tangible property are justified and created. For example, the exclu-
sive ownership of land is justified because the use by one person is incon-
sistent with use by others. 64 Without this exclusive ownership our
62. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
63. Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 n.6 (1980) (quoting United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (citations omitted)). In cases prior to Monsanto,
the Court accorded the status of constitutionally protected property to a wide range of intangible
interests. See, eg., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (property interest in statu-
torily created cause of action for discrimination against handicapped); United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (property interest in common law contract rights); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (property interest in social security benefits); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972) (property interest in continued employment); Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40 (1960) (property interest in materialman's lien); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (property interest in real estate lien); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571
(1934) (property interest in contract rights). See also cases cited in Logan, 455 U.S. at 428, 431.
The Monsanto Court held that trade secrets including informational property, have the essential
characteristics of more tangible property. 467 U.S. at 1002. Also, the Court noted by way of further
evidence that "Congress reasoned that submitters of data are 'entitled' to 'compensation' because
they 'have legal ownership of the data.'" Id. (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1560, 95th Cong., 2d.
Sess., 29 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1966, 2045).
64. See, eg., R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STEOBUCK, & D. WHITMAN, THE LAv OF PROPERTY 1-3
(1984). It may be that this invocation of the Coase theorem oversimplifies the analysis if viewed
from the perspective of all information gatherers, rather than simply the perspective of information
services. Refusal to extend legal protection to informational property would not result in the crea-
tion of such information; it will only lead to a greatly less than optimum amount of such information
(in the Pareto sense of optimality). Information will still be created if (but only if) its value to a
single user exceeds its cost of creation and if its subsequent disclosure to others does not eliminate its
value or affirmatively harm the creator of the information. Clearly, very little of such information
will be created and companies in the business of selling such information would probably cease to
exist.
One might argue that agricultural and other development will still occur without any legal recog-
nition of ownership rights. For example, such development occurs in communist countries. While
strictly communist countries have no private property rights, however, they do have property owner-
ship. The government owns the property, and therefore only the government invests in improve-
ments. The distinction which is crucial here is not the distinction between private property and
communism, but rather between recognition of property and anarchism.
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society would have little agricultural development and no permanent
substantial buildings.
Intangible property depends, for its creation and development, on a
guarantee that the cost of creating it will be spread over all of its users.
Thus, intangible property depends on the absence of what are often
called "free riders," rather than on exclusivity of use, as the means by
which society uses property law to enhance economic productivity. A
simple example will make this point clear. Assume that Bank A wants to
know my credit history. Bank A's access to that information does not
interfere with Bank B's access to it or even with the credit information
company's (C's) use of it. B and A do not harm C by looking at the
information for free. The only problem is that no one will have the in-
centive to collect credit information unless they know in advance that
their property interest will be protected from all such free riders.
Any individual free rider can persuasively argue that his use is costing
the information owner nothing. Yet the law is rapidly recognizing that
the right to restrict access provides the necessary incentive for making
useful information available in our society.
For example, computer crime statutes are now commonplace because
of the need to protect against private takings of the right to restrict access
to information.6" The events involved in United States v. Seidlitz66 illus-
trate the difficulties faced prior to the enactment of computer crime stat-
utes. Seidlitz accessed his former employer's computer without
permission and read and copied a valuable computer program. State
prosecutors in Maryland were unsuccessful in prosecuting because Mary-
land law at the time did not consider anything to have been taken. 67
Because of the fortuitous fact that Seidlitz accomplished some of the acts
via phone lines from nearby Virginia he was ultimately convicted of wire
65. See D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER (1976); D. PARKER, FIGHTING COMPUTER CRIME
(1983); T. WHITESIDE, COMPUTER CAPER, IMBEZZLEMENT, AND FRAUD (1983); Fetterley, Histori-
cal Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating to the Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 Bus. LAW 1535 (1970);
Sullival & Shaw, Criminal Penalties for Misappropriation of Computer Technology, COMPUTER LAW,
Jan. 1985, at 19 (1985); Thackeray, Computer-Related Crimes, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 300 (1985);
Vandevoort, Trade Secrets: Protecting a Very Special 'Property", 26 Bus. LAW. 681 (1971); Note,
Criminal Liability for the Misappropriation of Computer Software Trade Secrets, 63 U. DET. L. REV.
481 (1986); Note, A Suggested Legislative Approach to the Problem of Computer Crime, 38 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1173 (1981); Comment, Legislative Issues in Crime, 21 HARV. J. LEGIS. 239 (1984).
66. 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979).
67. Maryland is among the many states that have subsequently enacted applicable legislation.
See Note, Criminal Liability for the Misappropriation of Computer Software Trade Secrets, 63 U.
DET. L. REv. 481, 493-94 n.l10 (1986).
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fraud in federal court. If the defendant had stayed in Maryland, no con-
viction would have occurred.68
To solve this problem a number of states enacted statutes which define
the willful unauthorized accessing of a computer as a crime in and of
itself.69 Further, some speak in terms of theft by reading, while defining
property as "[i]nformation, including electronically produced data, and
computer software and programs in either machine or human readable
form, and any other tangible or intangible item of value."70
Trade secrets, which would include informational property as well as
more commonplace or technical trade secrets, have long been treated as
property. Reported cases treating trade secrets as property extend back
to the late 1700s,7 1 and trade secrets were surely part of English and
American business practice at the time of the adoption of the fifth
amendment. Informational property is a branch of trade secret property
which drastically increased in value and significance with the advent of
computers. No reason exists, however, to believe that the constitutional
definition of property should remain static.
The Monsanto holding that trade secrets constitute fifth amendment
property is the culmination of a trend in that direction. Prior to Mon-
santo courts occasionally denied that trade secrets were property, relying
on unfortunate dicta by Justice Holmes in a 1917 decision:
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary
fact that the law- makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted.
The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the
68. See also Comment, supra note 65, at 249 n.56:
The problem raised by intangible property is further illustrated by the case of Common-
wealth v. Yourawski, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1954, 425 N.E.2d 298. There the defendant
owned a cassette tape containing a pirated copy of Stars Wars, raising the question of
whether images and sounds on the tape were property subject to larceny under Massachu-
setts law. The court determined they were not and dismissed the indictment. The Youraw-
ski case was one of the reasons behind the Massachusetts legislature's amendment to its
larceny statute defining property to include "electronically processed or stored data, either
tangible or intangible, data while in transit. Act of May 31, 1983, ch. 147, [1983] 3 Mass.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 38 (Law Co-op) (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 266,
§ 30).
See also United States v. Sampson, 6 COMPUTrER L. SERv. REP. (Callaghan) 879 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4,
1978), discussed in Comment, supra note 65, at 252.
69. See, eg., Comment, supra note 65, at 250 n.62.
70. See id. at 249.
71. See Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 353-54 especially nn.87-89.
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starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs.... 72
This statement has not been widely followed.73 Further, it does not
actually negate property rights for "taking" purposes to say that the
rights are contractual, for rights existing because of contracts may not be
taken without running afoul of the fifth or fourteenth amendments.7 4 In
the end, however, Holmes' dicta, however logical when taken in its lim-
ited context,75 did not stand the test of experience.
In addition to frequent recognition in federal statutes of trade secret
property which includes informational property,76 virtually every state
now recognizes such property as a subset of trade secret property. The
72. E. I. DuPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). The Monsanto
Court discussed the Holmes dicta and paid it little heed. 467 U.S. at 1004 n.9. Prior to Masland the
Court and Holmes had spoken of trade secrets in property terms and, thus, the Masland dicta is
difficult to explain. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-53 (1905)
(Holmes, J.).
73. See 1 R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01(1) (1985).
74. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571 (1934).
75. The Masland case was a suit by DuPont seeking to enjoin a former employee from disclos-
ing or using trade secrets related to the manufacture of artificial leather. Masland denied that his
proposed manufacturing project would use any trade secrets not otherwise known in the trade. He
proposed to call several expert witnesses and revealed that he would disclose to those witnesses the
trade secrets in order to enable them to testify meaningfully. The trial court enjoined the proposed
disclosure to his expert witnesses and the injunction was ultimately upheld. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court but the Supreme Court reversed and re-instated the trial court's
ruling. The distinction Holmes made between a property right and a contract right is disjointed
from the remainder of the opinion, and appears to be a response to a tangential theoretical discussion
about the Third Circuit's analysis. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
76. See, eg., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982) (Freedom of Information Act exemption from disclo-
sure protecting "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential."); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c)(4)(A) (1982) (Toxic Substances Control Act provi-
sion for compensation for health and safety data if taken); 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1982) (restriction
prohibiting public disclosure by F.T.C. if trade secrets); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i)(1) (1987) (exempt-
ing trade secrets from OSHA "Right to Know" program); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (giving incomplete
protection to trade secrets and confidential information); various F.D.A. statutes discussed in Note,
Compensating Manufacturers, supra note 1, at 212. Further, the Monsanto Court noted:
Even the manner in which Congress referred to trade secrets in the legislative history of
FIFRA supports the general perception of their property-like nature. In discussing the
1978 amendments to FIFRA, Congress recognized that data developers like Monsanto
have a "proprietary interest" in their data. S. REP. No. 95-334, at 31. Further, Congress
reasoned that submitters of data are "entitled" to "compensation" because they "have legal
ownership of the data." H. R. CONF. REP. No., 95-1560, p. 29 (1978). U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1978, pp. 1966, 204 5 . This general perception of trade secrets as prop-
erty is consonant with a notion of "property" that extends beyond land and tangible goods
and includes the products of an individual's "labour and invention." 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
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majority of states follow section 757 of the first Restatement of Torts
which defines a "trade secret" as "any formula, pattern, device, or compi-
lation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it."' 7 7 The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not include a
COMMENTARIES 405; see generally J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERN-
MENT, ch. 5 (J. Gough ed. 1947).
8. Of course, it was not necessary that Congress recognize the data at issue here as
property in order for the data to be protected by the Taking Clause. We mention the
legislative history merely as one more illustration of the general perception of the property.
like nature of trade secrets.
467 U.S. at 1002-3.
Footnote eight gives considerable support to the argument set forth in this Article that the source
of law for defining general property is not simply the law of one state. Indeed, the Monsanto Court
pointed to other indicators that trade secrets are generally considered property:
Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property. A trade
secret is assignable. See, eg., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 401-02 (1911); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (CA 2 1971). A trade
secret can form the res of a trust, Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 82, Comment E (1959);
1 A. Scott, Law of Trusts § 82.5, p. 703 (3d ed. 1967), and it passes to a trustee in bank-
ruptcy. See In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 492, 496-97 (CA 7 1975).
Id. at 1002.
77. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939) (emphasis added). For an illustration of
the application of § 757 to confidential business information which this Article would classify as
informational property see Dynamics Research Corp. v. The Analytic Sciences Corp., 9 Mass App.
Ct. 254, 400 N.E.2d 1274, 207 U.S.P.Q. 321 (1980). Twenty states have adopted the Restatement's
analysis on this point. Drill Parts and Service Co., Inc. v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 439 So,2d 43
(Ala. 1983); Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d 287 (1977); Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co.
v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235 (Iowa 1988); Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talhird, Inc., 241
Md. 550, 217 A2d 375 (1966), USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 392 Mass. 334, 467 N.E.2d
1271 (1984), Hayes-Albion v. Kuberski, 421 Mich. 170, 364 N.W.2d 609 (1985), Rice Researchers,
Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So. 2d 1259 (Miss. 1987); National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d I (Mo.
1966); Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239 N.W.2d 772 (1976); Green-
spun v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 211, 533 P.2d 482 (1975); Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16
N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954); Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 328 N.Y.S.2d 423, 278
N.E.2d 636 (1972); Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining Service, Inc., 24 Ohio St.3d 41, 429
N.E.2d 814, 59 A.L.R.4th 629, 24 Ohio B. Rep. 83 (1986); North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Moore, 275
Or. 359, 551 P.2d 431 (1976); Felmlee v. Lockett, 466 Pa. 1, 351 A.2d 273 (1976); Lowndes Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761, 177 U.S.P.Q. 209 (1972); Ist Am. Systems, Inc. v.
Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51 (S.D. 1981); Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Martin, No. 87-230-II slip op.
(Tenn. Ct. App., Dec. 31, 1987) (see also Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Laboratories, Inc., 592
S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. 1979)); Luccous v. J.C. Kinley Co., 376 S.W.2d 336, 141 U.S.P.Q. 78 (Tex.
1964); J & K Computer Systems, Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982). Seven additional states
have the same coverage for the purposes of this Article, but do not use the Restatement. See State v.
Alaska Int'l. Air, Inc., 562 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1977) (statement limited to partial protection in dis-
covery context); Evans Laboratories, Inc. v. Melder, 262 Ark. 868, 562 S.W.2d 62 (1978); Keel v.
Quality Med. Sys., Inc., 515 So.2d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120
N.H. 626, 419 A.2d 1115, 215 U.S.P.Q. 354 (1980); Lovelace Clinic v. Murphy, 76 N.M. 645, 417
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss4/3
1988] "TAKING" INFORMATIONAL PROPERTY & DISCOVERY
section on trade secrets, but only because the authors felt that trade regu-
lation had evolved into a separate area of the law." Sixteen states have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act which defines trade secrets in a
way which, being of more recent origin, is more closely geared to infor-
mational property:
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, com-
pilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy. 79
Georgia, on the other hand, has used in some of its decisions an older
definition of trade secrets which was taken from Corpus Juris Secundum.
This definition does not appear to include information for its own value.
According to these Georgia cases, a trade secret "is aplan, process, tool,
mechanism or compound, known only to its owner and those of his em-
ployees to whom it must be confided in order to apply it to the uses
P.2d 450 (1966); United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 87 N.C. App. 296, 361 S.E.2d 292 (1987)
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 370 S.E.2d 375; Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 32 A.L.R.4th 410
(Wyo. 1981) (statement limited to partial protection in discovery context). Kentucy law also recog-
nizes trade secret rights, but the Kentucky courts have not defined trade secrets. Proctor & Gamble
Distributing Co. v. Vasseur, 275 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Ky. 1955).
Illinois once followed the approach originating in CORPUS JURIs SECUNDUM. See infra note 80
and accompanying text. Illinois has a recent statute taking the modem view. See infra note 79. Of
the 50 states, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, and Vermont appear to have no decisions on point.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 1 (1979). See also 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 73,
§ 2.01 n.2.
79. UNrv. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(4), 14 U.L.A. 541, 542 (1980) (emphasis added). The
following sixteen states have adopted the UTSA: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, In-
diana, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See generally Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
64 MARQ. L. REv. 277 (1980). For an example of how the Uniform Act protects confidential busi-
ness information which this Article would call informational property, see American Totalisator Co.
v. Autotote, Ltd., No. 7268 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1983) (LEXIS, states library, Del. file).
Many additional states have statutes other than the UTSA. Milgrim lists thirty-eight states with
some form of explicit statutory protection as of 1985. 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 73, § 1.01[2] app. at
B, B-1 (1985). As an example of an act which is too recent to appear in Milgrim, Illinois recently
passed the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 140 351-59 (Smith-Hurd 1985). Para-
graph 352(d) defines a "Tradesecret" as: "information, including but not limited to, technical or
non-technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing,
process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or supppliers ... [which is] sufficiently
secret to derive economic value ... from not being generally known ......
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intended [sic]." 8 Although some subsequent decisions have relied on the
Restatement, as recently as 1979 the Georgia Supreme Court chose by
way of dicta to maintain this definition rather than adopt a more modem
one.
81
Nonetheless, a clear consensus in favor of recognizing informational
property exists among the states,82 and is also reflected in a number of
federal statutes.83 More importantly, the Supreme Court's recent Mon-
santo decision explicitly accorded informational property fifth amend-
ment protection. Most importantly, treating information as property
furthers the purposes served by providing legal protection to other types
of property.
B. Establishing a Taking
The bundle of rights associated with informational property is not
complex. Rather, it consists of only one stick; the right to charge people
for allowing them to read84 information. The aspect of informational
80. See Taylor Freezer Sales Co., Inc. v. Sweden Freezer Eastern Corp., 224 Ga. 160, 164, 160
S.E.2d 356, 359 (1968) (quoting 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 148 at 750 (1955)) (emphasis added). See
generally Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information Under Georgia Law, 19 GA. L.
REv. 623 (1985). In Textile Rubber & Chem. Co. v. Shook, 243 Ga. 587, 589, 255 S.E.2d 705, 707
(1979), the Georgia Supreme Court retained the C.J.S. definition by way of dicta and without expla-
nation. Subsequent state and federal decisions applying Georgia law have applied the Restatement,
although evincing no awareness that they were breaking new ground. Yet, in some of these cases,
the difference was crucial. See, eg., Am. Photography Equipment Co. of Atlanta v. Henderson, 250
Ga. 114, 115, 296 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1982); Robert B. Vance & Associates, Inc. v. Baronet corp., 487
F. Supp. 790, 799 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (six months after Textile Rubber). Other state and federal deci-
sions, while not calling informational property a "trade secret," nonetheless accord it protection as
"confidential business information." See, eg., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 470
(N.D. Ga. 1986); Wesley-Jessen, Inc. v. Armento, 519 F. Supp. 1352, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Rollins
Protective Services Co. v. Palermo, 249 Ga. 138, 142, 287 S.E.2d 546, 550 (1982); Jenkins v. Jenkins
Irrigation, Inc., 244 Ga. 95, 101, 259 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1979) (four months after Textile Rubber) (dicta).
81. See Textile Rubber & Chemical Co. v. Shook, 243 Ga. 587, 589-90, 255 S.E.2d 705, 707-08
(1979). But see cases cited supra note 80.
82. Of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, forty-six protect informational property.
Four have no decisions on point. Only Georgia law is uncertain and may reject such property. See
supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 76.
84. Of course, in the context of computer data storage and retrieval, the word "read" has
gained a broader meaning.
Some may argue, however, that allowing one free reader (or free rider) does not take the property.
Allowing someone to take part of an information service's inventory is still a taking, even if the rest
remains for sale. If a store had 100 widgets for sale and the government took one widget, it would
have to pay for that widget even though the other 99 remain available for sale. Thus, if an informa-
tion service has 100 customers and the government enables one customer who would otherwise pay
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property which is most unusual and, indeed, separates it from other types
of intellectual property, is that anyone who reads the information has
taken it and must pay for it-because the reader has taken the entire
bundle of rights that the owner has.
The question of whether a taking has occurred depends on the degree
to which the government's action deprives the owner, rather than the
degree to which it benefits the government. In addition,
"[g]overnmental action short of the acquisition of title" can amount to a
taking.86 Thus, although the beneficiary may be a private litigant, and
although the information itself remains in the hands of the information
service, it is clear that discovery "takes" informational property.
The complex issues associated with the taking question need not long
detain us. The taking analysis turns on the degree of taking; "[i]f the
property owner loses too many important sticks from his bundle, his
property has been taken."87 Not all governmental regulations are tak-
ings, but the line between regulation and taking has varied. Professor
Sax, with good reason, has chided the Court for "introducing its uni-
formly unsatisfactory opinions in this area with the understatement that
'no rigid rules' or 'set formula' are available to determine where regula-
tion ends and taking begins."8" When we deal with a one-stick bundle of
rights, however, and that stick is taken, the line-drawing exercise be-
comes unnecessary.
to have the information for free, the fact that 99 customers remain does not rectify the taking of one
percent of the inventory. See also infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
85. See, eg., Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 341 nn.41-42. The benefit to the govern-
ment is relevant in the taking analysis when considering whether a taking is for a public purpose,
rather than whether a taking has occurred.
86. United States v. General Motor Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (footnote omitted).
87. Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 342. Cf. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 155 (1985). Professor, now Judge, Epstein persua-
sively argues that there is no meaningful distinction between partial and complete takings. This
Article heartily endorses, but does not depend on, Epstein's view.
88. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964). Professor Ross, however,
views the ad hoc nature of takings analysis as the healthy product of an ongoing competition be-
tween the values underlying the analysis. He believes that any attempt to create a clearer and more
predictable approach will result in the disguising of the real reasons behind difficult takings deci-
sions. See Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 372
(1986); Ross, Taking TAKINGS Seriously, 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1591 (1986). On the other hand, while
the Court's ad hoc decision making process allows it the flexibility necessary to properly balance the
competing interests in each individual case, it provides no basis for predicting the outcome of future
cases. The ramificiations of this argument are explored in Comment, Solving the Problem by Making
it Worse: Land- Use Takings Jurisprudence After Hamilton Bank, Lutheran Church, and California
Coastal, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 105 (1988).
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Informational property is taken whenever the government forces its
owner to disclose it to anyone who will use it as information. I have
earlier set forth a hypothetical case where the recipient of the informa-
tion would put it to another use (to test computer accuracy) and, in that
unlikely case, the information is not taken. In the context of informa-
tional property no middle-ground taking exists-there is no case where
some of the value is taken and some remains. The Court's struggles to
define taking in the middle-ground cases are thus irrelevant.
One may argue that litigation is, in some sense, in a special category.
As long as the litigator seeking discovery is not a customer for the infor-
mation outside the litigation context, or a competitor who could use the
information outside the litigation context, why not let him have it for
free? His use does not interfere with the use by others or the right to
charge those others. 89 The argument underlying this question contains
several flaws." First, the basic idea underlying trade secret property and
informational property is that a blanket prohibition on free riders is
needed to encourage the creation of the property. Every would-be free
rider can argue that his use does not harm the owner or interfere with
other uses. The law must enable a producer to spread the cost of gener-
ating the information among all users.9 If good reason exists for one
user to have the information, sufficient to merit governmental aid, that
89. In separate comments on preliminary drafts of this Article, Professors Dreyfuss and Gar-
field raised this argument, and I am indebted to both of them for their contributions. See supra,
introductory footnote.
90. In answering this argument at a theoretical level, I have, for the sake of simplicity, ignored
the marginal cost of producing the information, and the cost to an information service of having its
employees testify as to the authenticity of the data, as will be necessary if it is to be admitted at trial.
These serious impositions cannot normally be imposed on expert witnesses except upon bargained-
for compensation.
91. Otherwise we must face the "and then there were none" problem that will result. As each
user persuasively argues that his use does not deprive the owner of the right to charge others, and
thereby escapes payment, the owner finds that no one has paid.
A persuasive analogy may be drawn to the "per se taking" rule the Court has enunciated for cases
involving physical invasion. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982). No matter how little space is actually appropriated, a taking will be found. Any other rule
would drag the courts into embarrassing line-drawing over whether any given number of square feet
or percentage of available area is sufficient to trigger the taking analysis. See also supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
Further, the argument against applying the taking analysis, if examined carefully, depends on an
unstated assumption that only one person or a small number of persons want the information ser-
vice's data for litigation while a much larger number of paying customers remain to absorb the cost.
This assumption is open to serious doubt in many cases.
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fact merely shows the public purpose," and not the negation of a taking.
Second, the counterargument seems to assume that litigants are not a
market for information.9 The most obvious example of a business mak-
ing a market out of locating information for litigants would be private
detectives. Information services are likely to be a growing field, and they
will gather information designed to help litigants if they have an incen-
tive to do so.
Third, and most important, why should the law give litigation such
favored status?94 Lawyers and judges tend to develop a form of tunnel
vision which causes them to view the litigation process as if it were the
most vital part of our society. We must avoid such "legocentricism." If
the government must pay for property needed during wartime for the
national defense, then it certainly must not expect to be given free prop-
erty to aid the litigation process. The essence of informational property
is the elimination of all free riders; even the riders who will use the infor-
mation for good purposes95 take the property and, therefore, must pay
for it.
A final question arises when the information is in the possession of a
customer of the information service. In connection with the hypothetical
real estate information service discussed earlier, for example, imagine
that XYZ Realty Co. paid for the use of the data on market share and
has the data in its office when XYZ Realty is served with a discovery
request. The actual contractual terms between the information service
and XYZ Realty would determine whether this discovery request would
constitute a taking of the information service's property. 96 Common
sense dictates, however, that the information service will usually retain
92. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
93. The fact that litigants are seldom viewed as a market for information today is used to justify
giving information to litigants for free. Thus, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Cf. infra text
following note 155, and Section V of this Article (arguing that payment will cause more information
to become available).
94. For example, one can hardly contend that free access to discovery is a constitutional right.
See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying texts. Indeed, prior to 1938 discovery was largely unavail-
able. See supra note 4. Accordingly, to contend that discovery is a constitutional right, one would
have to contend that all litigation prior to 1938 violated the Constitution.
95. This Article will assume, for the sake of discussion, that litigation in general, and in particu-
lar the role of discovery in developing facts necessary for litigation, are "good" purposes. In the
author of this Article's view "the carriage has turned into a pumpkin." See supra note 4.
96. If the information, by virtue of the terms existing between the information service and
XYZ, has become the property of XYZ, no taking would occur if XYZ is required to give the
information to a litigant unless XYZ, itself, is a reseller of such information.
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title to the information, only allowing XYZ Realty to use it in ways that
do not destroy its confidentiality. In such cases the taking remains, just
as if the information service has been served, XYZ's possession being
analogous to that of a bailee.
C. The Public Use Requirement
In theory, at least, the government may not take property-even if
compensation is provided-if the taking is not for a "public use." 97
Property may not be taken for private use.
In practice, however, it is almost impossible to imagine a use which is
not a public use as courts have defined the term in recent cases. For
example, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,9 the State
of Michigan condemned an entire ethnically unique neighborhood so
that General Motors could build a new factory. As the saying goes,
"What's good for General Motors is good for the nation," or, at least, the
State of Michigan, so the court found a public purpose was found in the
economic benefits to the public.99 In Monsanto, taking Monsanto's safety
97. See, eg., Shizas v. City of Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 (1952); City of Owensboro
v. McCormich, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979); Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957);
Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978); Hogue v. Port of Seattle,
54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
98. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455
(1981). General Motors did not believe that its other plants were efficient enough, so it closed down
two other plants in the area to build the Poletown plant. The leveling of Poletown sent a large and
well-established Polish-American community on a diaspora. In many cases, elderly Poles who were
limited in their travel would never see life-long friends again.
See also Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278
(1975); Minneapolis v. Wukele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984); Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d 835
(1982); Mayor of Baltimore v. Chertkof, 441 A.2d 1044 (Md. 1982).
99. Poletown, 410 Mich. 616, 632, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458. Since G.M. was closing two other
plants located in Detroit in exchange for the Poletown plant because, among other things, those
plants were not suited to robotics, the argument that Poletown was needed to improve employment
is unsupportable. The economy has not improved since the taking, and no improvement is ever
likely to be attributable to the taking.
Although a full exploration of the subject is beyond the scope of this Article, my dissent from the
watering down of the public use requirement, of which Poletown is typical, should be noted. Use of
such analysis throughout this article reflects only my recognition of the fact that courts have aban-
doned the public use requirement. A serious rebirth of that requirement would mean that informa-
tional property could not be taken for private discovery at all.
I have borrowed somewhat loosely in the text from a statement made by Charles Wilson to Con-
gress in 1953 that has become a popular syaing. His actual statement was "What is good for the
country is good for General Motors, and vice versa." See S. JAMES, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIC
QUOTATIONS 9 (2d ed. 1984).
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data to help another company obtain permission to sell its product was
held to constitute a public use."° The Court relied on the benefit to the
public's health that would inure from having the information. Because
the other company could be required to generate the same information at
its own cost (or buy it from Monsanto) before it would receive permis-
sion to market the product, it is obvious that the Court accepted a weak
argument on this point.10
In comparison, the public benefit derived from more accurate litigation
seems to qualify easily. Taking informational property through discov-
ery might primarily benefit a particular litigant, in the same sense as the
primary recipient of the benefit of the condemnation of Poletown was
General Motors, but the secondary benefit to society is equally clear.
Unless the courts are prepared to put new teeth into the public use re-
quirement, informational property can be taken by the courts, with com-
pensation, for the benefit of litigants.
D. Just Compensation and Alternate Remedies
The just compensation provision requires that the owner be paid the
market value of the property the government has taken. 10 2 The ideal
measure of market value is an examination of recent sales prices of simi-
lar or identical property transferred between willing sellers and willing
buyers dealing at arm's length.10 3 A company operating exclusively as
an information service which has been in business for some time will
100. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014-16 (1984).
101. Indeed, the recent cases where a party has raised the public use issue reveal an attitude
prevalent in the courts of complete deference to the legislative judgment as to the public nature of
the use at issue. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984) ("So long as the
taking has a conceivable public character, 'the means by which it will be attained is ... for Congress
to determine.' "). Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 632, 304
N.W.2d 455, 458 (1981) ("The Legislature has determined that governmental action of the type
contemplated here meets a public need and serves an essential public purpose. The Court's role after
such a determination is made is limited."). Such an approach amounts to a complete abdication of
judicial review.
102. See, eg., D. CALLIES & R. FRIEDLICH, supra note 46, at 1030-31; L. ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953); Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of
Value, Good Will and Business Losses in Emminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604 (1968);
Bigham, "Fair Market Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24
VAND. L. REv. 63 (1970); Blum & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72
CALIF. L. REv. 569 (1984); Note, Compensating Manufacturers, supra note 1, at 201, especially n.81
and accompanying text.
103. See United States ex rel T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943); D. CALLIES & R. FRIED-
LICH, supra note 46, at 1030.
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often have established prices. These established prices, paid by normal
customers, should apply to a government taking. In other cases where
prices are not readily available, the court will have to estimate the market
value through the use of expert evaluators, as is presently done in many
condemnation cases. Note that in the context of informational property
there will be a wide gap between the marginal cost of newly producing
the information, and its market value in cases where existing data banks
are used. Market value includes overhead, profit, and the pro rata share
of the cost of generating the data base, as well as the marginal cost of
displaying or preparing the data for its imminent use.
In some cases the requirement of disclosure will cost the owner of in-
formational property a great deal more than simply the market price of
the information itself. In very unusual cases a particular information ser-
vice may actually find that it is so involved in responding to discovery
requests that it is unable to continue in business. This could happen if a
particular industry, such as the asbestos industry, suddenly becomes the
focus of a great deal of litigation, or if the information service is the only
such service of its type, or both.
A more likely problem is that the government may ultimately take the
entire business because the sources that provide the information on
which the information service relies-which are often its customers
themselves or persons in business with its customers-either cease sup-
plying information or begin supplying inaccurate information once they
realize that the information can be used to their disadvantage in litiga-
tion. Courts have wisely held that the takings clause requires compensa-
tion in other analogous fact situations when government action has
caused incidental damage to property beyond a basic taking. For exam-
ple, where the incidental result of the government's actions was to flood
nearby land, rendering it valueless, the Court held that the property had
been taken even though title had not passed to the government and the
government did not want the land."o The Court has repeatedly asserted
that "the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of
the right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking."'05 Accord-
104. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871). See also Sutfin v. State, 261 Cal. App. 2d
50, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1968) (taking occurs when flood waters from state highway project damage
automobiles). See generally Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Emminent Do-
main, 48 VAL. U. L. REv. 437 (1962); Note, Emminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelop-
ment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
105. Eg., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
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ingly, in cases where compelling disclosure of informational property
produces grave incidental damage, that loss requires compensation as
well, or else disclosure may not be required.1"6
Present court rules do not provide for compensation as a matter of
right.'0 7 If compensation is not available, any law which produces a tak-
ing is unconstitutional and therefore void. Thus, the first possible rem-
edy an owner of informational property might seek when faced with a
discovery request is a ruling that such discovery is not possible because,
as applied to such cases, the discovery rules are invalid.
One may argue that courts are unlikely to enjoin discovery under the
federal rules because a subsequent suit for compensation could be
brought against the federal government under the Tucker Act which
provides:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitu-
tion, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department,
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liqui-
dated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
10 8
This argument gives the owner of informational property a monetary
remedy in a subsequent Claims Court action against the United States.
Likewise, in state court cases, discovery could continue unabated where a
similar right of action against the state is available, although discovery
would have to be prohibited in states where a similar right of action did
not exist.
The difficulty with this argument is that neither the federal govern-
ment nor the various state governments is likely to be willing to pay for
the information in cases involving private litigants. There is a public in-
106. Fear that the price of information might be high is, at best, irrelevant as an argument
against the taking analysis urged here. Land taken for highways is often so expensive as to deter
highway projects. At worst, the high price of such information cuts in favor of the taking analysis
urged here in that it dramatizes the injuries that are presently being permitted.
107. See supra notes 2, 4-5, 11-14, 34-35 and accompanying texts. Professor Dreyfuss, in a com-
ment on a draft of this Article, suggested an argument that the data bank might qualify for treatment
as an expert and, therefore, require payment under present practice. I endorse this approach as I
believe our present practice with regard to experts is constitutionally required.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). The Tucker Act has no relevance to disclosures compelled by
state law.
Injunctive relief to prohibit an uncompensated taking is not available if the use is for a public
purpose and authorized by law, when a subsequent suit for compensation is possible. Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 966, 1016-17, 1020 (1984); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682, 697 (1949). The fifth and fourteenth amendments do not require that compensation
precede a taking. See also Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932).
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terest in accurate litigation, but not a very strong interest. 10 9 A decision
that Tucker Act relief should be invoked would keep discovery constitu-
tional, but would produce an immediate change in the discovery rules.
The only viable alternatives involve having the party seeking the dis-
covery pay for it. Some existing disclosure statutes employ this mecha-
nism, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure use it in limited areas,
such as the rather analogous area of discovery of the opinions held by
hired expert witnesses.110 Payment by the party seeking discovery could
be achieved by altering the discovery rules to explicitly deal with infor-
mational property. Alternatively, this result could be achieved, at least
as a stopgap measure, by reading the Rule 26 discretionary power to
grant protective orders111 as a mandatory protective power when infor-
mational property is at issue.
E. Waiver Doctrines
Companies that do business in ways that affect the people around them
may be called upon to conform to a reasonable degree of regulation. In
such cases that regulation often "takes" some of their property. Such
109. The fact that the government would be so clearly unwilling to pay for the information tends
to undercut the conclusion, stated earlier, that such a taking would be for a public use. See supra
notes 97-101 and accompanying text. Because such an argument was rejected in, for example, the
Poletown case, where General Motors was to pay for the state's purchase of the property at issue, see
supra note 98 and accompanying text, this Article assumes that having the private litigant pay the
compensation presents no problem.
110. See supra note 5. A number of federal statutes including FIFRA, which was at issue in
Monsanto, and TSCA also contain provisions for interparty compensation. See supra note 76.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), provides the judge with authority to charge the cost of discovery to
the requesting party. The rule provides the following eight options for the judge in fashioning an
order once "good cause" is shown:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of discovery be limited to
certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial informa-
tion not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
Id. (emphasis added).
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takings, however, do not require compensation.1 12 This result is most
often reached by claiming that no taking is occurring. An artificial di-
chotomy is created between takings and regulations. Such feats of se-
mantics simply express the conclusion that compensation is, or is not,
respectively, required. The underlying analysis resembles a kind of
waiver doctrine far more than a sensible categorical distinction. By
choosing to do a certain type of business which affects others, a company
waives its right to compensation to the degree necessary to regulate that
business. Some degree of regulation, then, is a cost of doing business. 113
If the company does not wish to endure the regulation, it can avoid regu-
lation by not engaging in profitable actions which have the potential to
affect others.
Whether disclosure of informational property may be required under
this "waiver" or "regulation" analysis will depend on whether the infor-
mation company fits the logical paradigm for such a waiver. Credit re-
porting services, for example, can do great harm to the public if their
records carry false information. Thus, federal and state laws requiring
disclosure of a credit applicant's file to the applicant114 "take" the credit
reporting services' informational property because, in the absence of gov-
ernment compulsion, a fee would be charged for the information dis-
closed." 5 In effect, however, the credit services waive the right to
compensation by engaging in an activity which can seriously harm others
if done improperly.
A more typical information service, such as the hypothetical real estate
information service employed earlier in this Article, would not be subject
to such waiver or regulation doctrines. If one assumes that a discovery
112. See, eg., Sax, supra note 88; Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 354-56.
113. See, e.g., Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 354 ("In effect, the Court reasoned that
Monsanto bought a license to sell pesticides... and paid for it by disclosing its data pursuant to the
post-1978 statute."); Note, Compensating Manufacturers, supra note 1, at 213-14 ("The cost of
health and safety data should be viewed as an inevitable cost of doing business in a society which is
concerned about the health and safety of its citizens.") (footnote omitted).
114. See, eg., supra note 20 (federal act: disclosure when credit report is basis of adverse ac-
tion). Notably, in the absence of adverse action the subject of the report must pay a reasonable fee to
receive a copy of the report. This provision is entirely consistent with the analysis in this Article in
that no basis for waiver is present where the report is not harmful. If the act required a free disclo-
sure in the absence of adverse action (here, denial of credit), it would have taken informational
property from the credit reporting company without compensation and the statute would be
unconstitutional.
115. At the time of this writing, T.R.W., the best known credit reporting agency, has begun
aggressively advertising its new service through which a person may examine his own file for a fee.
Whether such a market will prove substantial is not yet known.
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order can take their information at will, the only way to avoid waiving
the right to compensation would necessarily be to have no business at all
which deals in information. Such companies do not endanger those
around them and a. blanket right to discovery, as presently exists, cannot
be justified under a waiver or regulation doctrine.
IV. APPLYING TAKING ANALYSIS TO INFORMATIONAL PROPERTY
A. Distinguishing Monsanto and the Protective Order Cases
A few lower courts, dealing with disclosure requirements other than
discovery, have held that compelled disclosure of trade secrets consti-
tutes a taking.116 These cases, however, dealt with traditional trade
secrets, such as the processes for making a particular product, rather
than informational property. Therefore, it was possible to avoid any tak-
ing by issuing protective orders prohibiting disclosure to competitors. If
Company X has a trade secret which allows it to manufacture widgets at
twice the normal speed, disclosure of that secret to OSHA officials who
are interested in worker safety in a higher speed plan constitutes no tak-
ing. Company X's ownership rights bundle of sticks is still intact. If
OSHA shows Company Y (a competing widget manufacturer) the secret,
a taking has occurred. X could have charged Y a fee for the right to use
the process. Thus, a protective order prohibiting OSHA officials from
disclosing the secret to competitors, at least in theory,1 17 prevents a tak-
ing from occurring.
These trade secret/protective order cases, while helpful in establishing
the property right and laying some of the groundwork for taking analy-
sis, do not provide a useful remedy in cases involving informational prop-
erty. Even in cases where OSHA forces disclosure of informational
property to OSHA, alone, the taking occurs in the initial disclosure. Re-
publication to a potential customer is not needed because OSHA is a
potential customer. Thus, the only protective order sufficient to prevent
116. See, e.g., Wearly v. Fed. Trade Comm'n., 462 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated on ripe-
ness grounds, 616 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980); Truswal Systems Corp.
v. Hydro-Air Eng., Inc., 813 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
117. In cases involving extremely valuable trade secrets some parties have chosen to default on
some or all issues rather than trust such a protective order. If someone violated the order and
disclosed the secret, proof of that fact would sometimes be difficult to find. Further, if such proof
were available, no remedy could ever replace the exclusivity that now exists with regard to, for
example, the formula for Coca-Cola (Classic, of course).
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a taking of informational property would be one requiring compensation
or interdicting the requirement of disclosure.
The leading case dealing with compelled disclosure of informational
property is Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.11 8 FIFRA authorizes the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to approve pesticides. At issue in Mon-
santo was the EPA's ability to use without compensation confidential
data, submitted in support of one company's pesticide, in evaluating sub-
sequent pesticide applications submitted by other companies. A further
complication was that amendments to FIFRA created three relevant
statutory periods. Concerning period one, the period prior to October
22, 1972, FIFRA contained no guidance as to whether the EPA could
use data from one application in another application.1 19 In period two,
October 22, 1972 to September 30, 1978, the statute specifically protected
trade secrets, including informational property, from disclosure unless
the later applicant compensated the first applicant for the value of the
confidential data used.1 20 The statute provided an arbitration arrange-
ment to resolve questions as to the value of the information. Finally, for
period three, the period after September 30, 1978, the statute granted
applicants a ten year period of exclusive use of data submitted after that
date. At the conclusion of the ten year period, the EPA may freely use
and disclose the data.' 21 With regard to data submitted prior to Septem-
ber 30, 1978, applicants were given a fifteen year period during which a
subsequent applicant would have to pay compensation to them for use of
118. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
119. 467 U.S. at 991-92. The Court's characterization is employed here in the text and the
analysis based on Monsanto. The Court's assertion that federal law was silent with regard to disclos-
ing trade secrets during this period, however, is difficult to believe. During this period, the United
States Department of Agriculture (which had jurisdiction under FIFRA before the EPA) had a
formal policy of non-disclosure on which an applicant could rely. See 7 C.F.R. § 370.13(d) (1968).
Further, the Trade Secrets Act provided criminal penalties for a government employee who dis-
closed trade secret information revealed to him during the course of his official duties. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905 (1982). The Court unpersuasively distinguished this latter section. 467 U.S. at 1008. Justice
O'Connor dissented in part in Monsanto. She disagreed with the Court's analysis on this point,
saying "[i]t seems to me that the criminal sanctions in the Trade Secrets Act... created at least as
strong an expectation of [confidentiality of trade secret data] ... before 1972 as the precatory lan-
guage of § 10 created after 1972." 467 U.S. 1022. See generally, 467 U.S. 1021-24. In order to
permit further exploration of the analysis in Monsanto, the remainder of this Article will assume that
the Court's conclusion that federal law was silent with regard to trade secrets is correct.
120. FIFRA was amended by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)).
121. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(l)(D) (1982). See Monsanto 467 U.S. at 994. The idea of the exclusive
use period is endorsed in McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Stat is of Health and Safety Infor-
mation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 837 (1980).
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the data.12 2 The EPA may use and disclose data older than fifteen years
without compensation. 12 3 Further, the 1978 amendments added a new
section with the potential to undermine even the ten and fifteen year peri-
ods. Section 10(d)124 provides for disclosure of all health, safety, and
environmental data to the public, notwithstanding the (limited) protec-
tion afforded to trade secrets elsewhere in the Act. The amendments
gave functional trade secrets and some informational property protection
from public disclosure unless the EPA "determines that such disclosure
is necessary in the public interest." '125 Obviously, Monsanto was un-
happy with such a flimsy guarantee.
Monsanto was able to show that the development of a pesticide typi-
cally requires the expenditure of $5 million to $15 million annually for
several years. The development process may take up to twenty-two years
and it is usually fourteen to twenty-two years before any return on invest-
ment is realized.126 For every pesticide actually marketed, a typical com-
pany will have screened and tested 20,000 others. 127 Monsanto
demonstrated, and the trial court found, that it had incurred costs in
excess of $23.6 million in developing the health, safety, and environmen-
tal data at issue, and that that data had continuing value to Monsanto
beyond its use in gaining approval for particular pesticides.12 The dis-
trict court found that the amended FIFRA provisions "give Monsanto's
competitors a free ride at Monsanto's expense," and enjoined the EPA
from disclosing the information. 129
Justice Blackmun wrote for a nearly unanimous Court. 30 First, he
examined whether "commercial data of the kind involved in this case"'13 1
122. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982).
123. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(iii) (1982).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d) (1982).
125. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(2) (1982). The Court did not discuss this provision, although the opin-
ion quotes it as part of a lengthy quote from the statute in its footnote 5. 467 U.S. at 996.
126. Monsanto Co. v. Acting Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
564 F. Supp. 552, 555 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
127. Id. Monsanto had a significantly better than average success ratio; successfully marketing
one in 10,000 chemicals tested. Id.
128. Id. at 560.
129. Id. at 566-68.
130. Justice White did not participate, and Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in
apart. O'Connor took a stronger view that the taking required compensation even during period
one. See supra note 119. The remaining justices joined in the Blackmun opinion.
131. 467 U.S. at 1001. The terminology suggests an awareness by Blackmun that he was dealing
with what this Article calls informational property rather than a traditional trade secret. See supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
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is property for the purposes of the takings clause. He concluded that "to
the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety, and envi-
ronmental data cognizable as a trade-secret right under Missouri law,
that property right is protected."' 132
Given that the data is property, the only questions remaining, accord-
ing to the Court, were whether a taking had occurred, whether it was for
a public purpose, or whether just compensation was provided. 13 3 As a
student commentator has pointed out, each of these questions has an ut-
terly obvious answer.1 34  Nonetheless, Blackmun began a convoluted
analysis of whether a taking had occurred, and got lost along the way.
Blackmun decided that the taking question depended on whether
Monsanto had a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" with which
the FIFRA disclosure provisions interfered.135 This analysis led Black-
mun to focus on the provisions in FIFRA during the three time periods
as the source of any and all expectations Monsanto could have. In pe-
riod one, when the Act was silent, it could induce no such expectation.
Accordingly, data submitted during period one was not protected. 136
Likewise, in period three, when the Act allowed disclosure, no such ex-
pectations were possible.137 In period two, however, when the Act guar-
anteed protection, property rights arose and the subsequent retroactive
abandonment of those rights by the 1978 amendments was a taking that
required compensation. 13
What is most puzzling here is that the Court employed the "reasonable
investment-backed expectations" analysis not to determine if a taking oc-
curred, but rather to unnecessarily re-decide whether the information is
property. In cases involving trade secrets, where the bundle of rights
consists of only one stick, the taking question is always clear. If a trade
secret is disclosed to a free rider, it is taken. 139 Thus, the usual purpose
132. 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
133. The Court says as much at 467 U.S. at 1000-01. See also supra text following note 37.
134. Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1. Accordingly, the Note concludes that Monsanto
should have followed its own analysis and held that disclosure of information from all three periods
constitutes a taking.
135. 467 U.S. 1005-08. The student Note points out that this analysis is only relevant to cases
involving partial takings. Trade secrets cannot be partially taken. Thus, under traditional analysis
Blackmun never should have addressed such matters. Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 347.
136. 467 U.S. at 1009-10. Justice O'Connor dissented as to this point. See supra note 22.
137. 467 U.S. at 1013.
138. Id. at 1011, 1013.
139. Implicit in the conept of "free rider" is that he uses the trade secret in a manner for which
he could otherwise have paid. See supra text following note 35. If a trade secret is not protected by
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of the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" analysis-to deter-
mine whether a taking has occurred-is irrelevant. Further, the very law
which is challenged cannot, itself, set the expectations. 140 Otherwise,
with the exception of retroactive application cases, takings would never
occur and the Constitutional protection could be legislated away.
Yet the Court may have reached the right result in Monsanto, even if
by the wrong reasoning. Reconstructing the opinion, we find that the
Court first held that the informational property involved was general
property. The obvious result, reached by the trial court, that any EPA
disclosure would take that property, however, must overcome a waiver
argument not clearly enunciated but likely assumed by the Court. 141 The
safety data may be eligible for the waiver analysis1 42 because Monsanto is
the court, it is logically indistinguishable from informational property. See supra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text.
140. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. The statement quoted in the text at note 43, is
from Monsanto itself, and makes the Court's use of FIFRA to redefine the property impossible to
explain.
141. For example, the Monsanto opinion begins with a lengthy explanation of the problems pes-
ticides present to the environment, and the history of regulatory control. These facts are relevant to
a waiver argument, in order to decide whether the enforced waiver is permissable. See infra note
146. Yet these facts have no bearing whatsoever on the analysis used by the Court.
Also note that the Court dismissed an argument that FIFRA preempts state law. 467 U.S. at
1012. The EPA's reasons for raising such a claim remain unclear. A void statute cannot preempt
state law. Any federal statute that attempted to preempt state law creating constitutionally pro-
tected property rights would necessarily be void under the fifth amendment. This author can imag-
ine no situation where preemption would be relevant.
Federal statutes often preempt previously existing state law and, in so doing, may eliminate privi-
ously existing state-law-based causes of action. Thus, it may be asked whether preemption of a new
area by Congress would be an unconstitutional taking of an individual's property rights in a chose of
action. I believe that if such preemption works retroactively to eliminate causes of action created by
state law which were within the valid reach of state law when created, a taking has occurred. I am
not aware of any cases where federal preemption has been given such a retroactive effect. Most often
Congress provides a future effective date when enacting legislation.
142. A persuasive argument that the waiver imposed is unacceptable is found in Note, Federal
Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 354-56. Because the governmental need at issue in Monsanto
was the need to aid a competitor in avoiding the cost of duplicating the research, rather than safety, I
must likewise express some reluctance in approving the Court's use of the waiver analysis. In my
view the Court could have saved vital statutes, such as the "Right to Know" acts, under the waiver
analysis, but probably ought not apply the waiver analysis to FIFRA provisions addressed more to
efficiency than safety.
Nonetheless, other commentators have applied the waiver analysis. For example, one commenta-
tor notes,
Monsanto, on the other hand, can be seen as creating the risk that prompted the regula-
tion. A "creation of the harm" or "noxious use" test was first introduced by the Supreme
Court in holding railroads responsible for the costs of building grade separations necessi-
tated by the fear of accidents where trains intersected public highways. The Court rea-
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in a dangerous and heavily regulated business which, as Rachel Carson
demonstrated over a generation ago, 143 affects the health and safety of
everyone. Monsanto could keep its data secret by simply not choosing to
market new potentially dangerous chemicals. Otherwise, the disclosure
of the data becomes a necessary cost of doing a type of business from
which society must protect itself.
Thus, the fact that the information was general property becomes irrel-
evant.'" The Court seems to have unknowingly continued beyond the
general property analysis, however, to the realization that FIFRA cre-
ated special property during period two by its voluntary promise of
greater protection. The use of a reliance-based analysis, so inappropriate
to the determination of whether a taking has occurred in trade secret
cases, is quite correct for determining whether special property has been
created.145 Likewise, the use of federal statutes not merely as evidence of
what is property, but to determine whether the information is property,
although entirely circular in cases involving general property, is appro-
priate to special property. Thus, Monsanto is really a special property
decision.
A full exploration of the waiver doctrine, which must be invoked in
Monsanto before the terms of FIFRA obtain any relevance, is beyond the
scope of this Article. Certainly the government may not require an ut-
terly unreasonable waiver before it will grant a privilege such as the right
to market a pesticide. The FIFRA provisions which permit EPA disclo-
soned in those cases that "[hiaving brought about the problem, the railroads are in no
position to complain because their share in the cost of alleviating it is not based solely on
the special benefits accruing to them from the improvements." Like the railroads, the
chemical industry presents special risks to safety even though it plays an essential role in
the economy.
Note, Compensating Manufacturers supra note I, at 199 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 213.
143. See R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
144. The rights created, according to the Court, by Missouri law and, according to this Article,
by a federal constitutional court-made law, have become irrelevant because the federal government is
able to require that Monsanto waive any taking claim in exchange for the right to market potentially
dangerous chemicals. Thus, if congress had not promised during period two that it would not exact
such a waiver, no compensation would be due.
145. As an aside, note that a student commentator has also pointed out that the Court's applica-
tion of the reliance-based analysis is seriously inaccurate in that it fails to take into account the time
delay between the expenditure to create "investment-backed expectations" and the actual applica-
tion. Thus, investments which were made during period two, but which came to fruition during
period three (and resulted in an application during period three) would be taken by uncompensated
disclosures authorized by the Court. Because the developmental periods of the chemicals at issue
range from fourteen to twenty-two years, such an overlap between periods would be commonplace.
See Note, Disclosure Statutes supra note 1, at 350.
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sure of Monsanto's data to persons interested in overseeing government
environmental protection are more readily justified than the provision
which permit subsequent applicants to use the data.146 Yet the latter
provisions were the focus of the discussion in Monsanto. Therefore, one
could argue that the Monsanto Court incorrectly rejected the argument
that FIFRA placed unconstitutional conditions on the privilege of mar-
keting a pesticide. 47
This Article has employed civil discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as a paradigm for investigating the taking question.
These discovery provisions apply to everyone, and do not reflect a waiver
in exchange for the right to engage in an unusual or dangerous activity.
Thus, the waiver analysis which is so crucial to the Monsanto decision
146. The provisions that allow a competitor to use the data to obtain permission to market
another product are not safety provisions. The EPA will require the competitor to produce safety
data, in any event, before it will grant permission. These provisions aim at efficiency and cost sav-
ings.
The importance of the public disclosure or "Right to Know" provisions, on the other hand, relates
most directly to safety. One student commentator explains:
The recent disaster in Bhopal, India, reinforces society's need to have adequate information
about the health effects of industrial chemicals. The chemical involved in the Bhopal acci-
dent, methyl isocyanate, was responsible for injuring or killing more than 200,000 people.
Workers on duty at the time of the accident believed the chemical was harmful only as an
eye irritant. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1985, at 56, col. 2 (midwest edition).
Note, Compensating Manufacturers, supra note 1, at 189 n.2.
147. See supra note 142. The standard applicable for determining when the government-im-
posed terms are too harsh is uncertain. The Court unrealistically applied a "voluntary" standard,
stating:
Because the market for Monsanto's pesticide products is an international one, Monsanto
could decide to forgo registration in the United States and sell a pesticide only in foreign
markets. Presumably, it will do so in those situations where it deems the data to be pro-
tected from disclosure more valuable than the right to sell in the United States.
467 U.S. at 1007 n.ll. More realistically assessing the facts, however, a student commentator
concludes:
In effect, the Court reasoned that Monsanto bought a license to sell pesticides in the United
States and paid for it by disclosing its data pursuant to the post-1978 statute. This argu-
ment might be persuasive if the bargain recognized by the Court were of the type that two
parties, negotiating freely, could be expected to reach. But the "bargain" in Monsanto was
not voluntary.
Note, Disclosure Statutes, supra note 1, at 354. Yet both of these views agree on the wrong standard.
If the bargain was truly voluntary, the force of law would never be required. The "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine exists so that some limit may be imposed on the government's power to impose
(not "negotiate for") conditions. That limitation is not based on voluntariness; it is based on the
reasonableness of the relationship between the magnitude of the possible harm the law seeks to
control or prevent and the condition(s) imposed. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct.
3141, 3147-48 (1987); Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Modelfor the Takings
Issue, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 465, 487 (1983). The Monsanto opinion contains no such analytical justifi-
cation for the FIFRA disclosures. In this regard Nollan appears to have overruled Monsanto.
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with regard to periods one and three has no bearing on discovery ques-
tions. In a case involving a simple discovery request, the analysis would
begin and end with the recognition that informational property is general
property.
Federal C.I.D. statutes, 148 for example, appear to be governed by the
same analysis. These are simply discovery provisions which operate
without the need for existing litigation. Other statutory disclosure provi-
sions, such as those in FIFRA,'4 9 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,"' ° cer-
tain OSHA provisions,151 Clean Air provisions, 152 and various "Right to
Know" acts, 53 are subject to individual discussion and analysis that is
beyond the scope of this Article. These statutes deal specifically with
conduct that has the potential to endanger others and certain conditions
may be placed on the right to engage in such conduct. Subject to the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the government may require a
waiver of fifth or fourteenth amendment rights when permitting such
conduct.
B. The Importance of Information to the Litigation Process and Other
Vital Societal Objectives
A final argument against the taking analysis set forth in this Article
stresses the importance of information to the litigation process. One may
argue that the taking analysis urged here will seriously reduce the accu-
racy of civil and even criminal adjudication. 154 The answer to this argu-
ment is both to traverse and demur.
By way of traverse, the taking argument is limited to cases involving
informational property. Ordinary information remains entirely unaf-
fected; even more customary trade secrets are only guaranteed a protec-
tive order prohibiting their disclosure or use by competitors. 55 Thus,
this taking analysis affects only a small share of the information used in
148. See supra note 15. See also Note, Compensating Manufacturers, supra note 1, at 189-90
(partial listing of other statutes resulting in disclosure). See also id. at 192, 212.
149. See supra note 16.
150. See supra note 20.
151. See supra note 18.
152. See supra note 19.
153. See supra note 21.
154. This Article has focused on civil discovery rather than discovery and the subpoena power in
the context of criminal adjudication. The takings analysis would not vary in the criminal context,
although certain cases involving indigent defendants and crucial information might require that the
government pay for the information.
155. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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litigation. Further, even informational property may be taken if the need
is genuine, but it must be paid for. Thus, the discovery rules should be
amended to provide for payment by the requesting party. This will un-
doubtedly eliminate "fishing expedition" discovery in this small category
of cases, 156 but parties who genuinely need the information will pay for
it. Finally, and most importantly, because the requirement of payment
provides an incentive, companies will generate, preserve and make avail-
able more information that litigants tend to find useful. Thus, in the long
run, there will be an increase rather than a decrease in the information
available to litigants.
By way of demurrer, the argument that the application of taking anal-
ysis to informational property will reduce the accuracy of litigation must
be treated as two arguments: a policy argument and a constitutional ar-
gument. At the policy level, such an argument is legally insufficient be-
cause a clear constitutional command cannot be overcome by a showing
that some would say it is unwise. 157 Further, many highly valuable soci-
etal objectives could be more easily attained if the takings clause did not
exist. Schools, highways, and hospitals, would all be far more affordable,
and one could make a pressing argument for exempting each such type of
public use from the takings clauses. The idea implicit in the policy argu-
ment against applying taking analysis to informational property so that
litigation should come before public health, for example, is an absurd
product of lawyers' tunnel vision.
At the constitutional level such an argument likewise fails. One may
not plausibly suggest that due process 158 gives a right to full discovery for
156. "Fishing expedition" discovery is normally allowed. See, eg., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 507 (1947) ("No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case."). When balanced only against
inconvenience, courts have thought it best to allow litigants to ask questions that appear irrelevant if
there is a chance of turning up useful information. The mounting pressure against the excessive cost
of discovery is gradually changing courts' attitudes on fishing expeditions. Clearly, where a fishing
expedition can only be had by paying for the information, such forays will be less common.
157. Cf., eg., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974) (Marshall, J.) (stating, in context of
policy argument against applying jury trial guarantee to race discrimination actions under Title
VIII: "We are not oblivious to the force of petitioner's policy arguments ... the possibility that jury
prejudice may deprive a victim of discrimination of the verdict to which he or she is entitled ...
More fundamentally, however, these considerations are insufflcient to overcome the clear command
of the Seventh Amendment.") (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (applicable to federal courts), XIV (applicable to state courts).
See supra note 94. Further, the sixth amendment may play a role in some criminal cases. See supra
note 153. The equal protection clause might also be urged in civil and criminal cases by arguing that
the requirement of paying for information discriminates against the poor, cutting off their access to
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a number of reasons. First, discovery is discretionary.t 9 Also, discovery
as we know it today did not exist when either the fifth or fourteenth
amendments were drafted. 1" Further, even at the absolute limits al-
lowed by judicial discretion, discovery and the right to information is not
absolute. Most notably, discovery is unavailable where information is
privileged.61 In the unusual case of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the privilege itself is of constitutional magnitude.162 If all privileges
were of constitutional magnitude, one might plausibly assert that the
right to information for litigation is a constitutional right. One constitu-
tional right may be outbalanced by another. 163 But if a common law
privilege can outbalance the right to information, the right to informa-
tion cannot be constitutional in nature. Certainly, then, the right to free
information must fall before the explicit constitutional protection of the
takings clause.
V. SOLUTIONS AND SYNTHESIS: OBEYING THE CONSTITUTION
EVEN WHEN IT IS COSTLY TO Do So
This Article has demonstrated that a property interest can exist in in-
formation. Further, in today's world, informational property constitutes
one of the most rapidly growing types of property. Clearly, our present
approach to discovery can result in a prohibited taking of informational
the courts. Such an argument is not likely to succeed. The poor are not even guaranteed an attorney
under the equal protection clause. In criminal cases only, they are guaranteed an attorney under the
sixth amendment, and this might require that the government pay for some informational property
when needed by a poor criminal defendant.
159. See, eg., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and
Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1979). Indeed, the trial court's discretion over discovery matters is very
broad.
160, Extensive discovery became generally available in the federal courts in 1938 with the advent
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra notes 4, 94. States gradually began copying the
federal rules, and many did not have extensive discovery for years after 1938.
161. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26; C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 549-50.
162. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Indeed, the priest-penitent privilege may be rooted in the reli-
gion clauses. See U.S. CONST., amend. I. The physician-patient privilege might be seen as rooted in
the penumbra-based right to bodily and medical privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
This seems unlikely, as extending the constitutional right to medical privacy that far would certainly
render Rule 35's provision for court-ordered medical exams unconstitutional. The attorney-client
privilege is but one example of a privilege that is not constitutional in nature.
163. See, eg., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (subordinating first amendment right to criti-
cize the government to constitutional foreign affairs power); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976) (subordinating sixth amendment concerns); In re Japanese Electronic Products An-
titrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (subordinating seventh amendment right to jury trial
to fifth amendment right to due process).
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property without compensation. Using discovery mechanisms to obtain
free data, otherwise available for the same use only upon payment,
amounts to using the legal process to steal the inventory of a business
that sells information. A pair of shoes on the shelf of a shoe store would
receive constitutional protection from such a taking; no reason appears
why valuable information should not.
The likely short term cost to litigants of having to pay for information
where informational property is involved will be offset by increased avail-
ability of information for litigants in the future. The market incentive
will produce a wide range of sources with protection from free riders.
However, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution do not depend on
this increased availability. Thus, even if the payment for use of informa-
tional property becomes very costly to litigants, the Constitution requires
such compensation. Compensation is neither convenient nor inexpensive
when property is taken to build schools, roads, military bases, or hospi-
tals. No reason appears why litigation should be treated differently.
Although the assertion that the use of information to benefit private
litigations is a public use seems tenuous, past decisions' 4 have made it
clear that the public interest in effective litigation would make such a
taking possible if compensation was provided. Yet the government's in-
terest is so limited that the private litigants will be the ones to pay for the
information. Thus, the Tucker Act remedy16 of a claim against the gov-
ernment creates more problems than it solves. It now seems clear that
the discovery rules should be amended to provide that the requesting
party must compensate the owner of informational property when such
property is the subject of compelled disclosure. At times this compensa-
tion requirement may prove costly either because it involves a great deal
of money or because a litigant may decide to do without information that
could aid in truth seeking. Even when compliance is costly, the Consti-
tution must be obeyed.
164. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text. Takings of informational property for the
government's use, as in, for example, the case of C.I.D. statutes would be satisfactorily dealt with
under the Tucker Act remedy.
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